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As extension educators,  we often are called upon to discuss and ex-
plain those risks related to the quality, healthfulness and/or safety of
our food and water.  In many cases there  are no easy answers.  Even
when  we  perceive  an  answer  as  clear-cut,  getting  it  across  to  an
American public not trained in science and wary of sweeping statements
made  by scientists  or government  bureaucrats  is no simple matter.
The need to develop effective and meaningful ways of presenting com-
plex technical material clouded by uncertainty and inherently difficult
to understand has led to a growing field of study called "risk communi-
cation."
Risk communication has been defined as any public or private com-
munication that informs individuals about the existence,  nature, form,
severity or acceptability of risks (Plough and Krimsky). It is considered
an adjunct to, but by no means replacement  of, risk assessment (the
characterization  of potential adverse health effects of human exposure
to hazards) and risk management (the process of evaluating alternative
regulatory actions and selecting among them) (Needleman). Risk com-
munication also does not replace risk regulation. All are necessary com-
ponents in maintaining the healthfulness  and quality of any ecosystem.
In its report, Improving  Risk Communication, the Committee on Risk
Perception and Communication of the National Research  Council (NRC),
stresses  the interactive  nature of  risk  communication.  The  authors
distinguish between risk  messages - one-way written, audio or visual
packages  developed  by experts to present  information about risk to
nonexperts - and the process of risk communication - an interactive
exchange  of information  and  opinion among individuals,  groups and
institutions  (National Research  Council).  They  further  challenge  the
view that risk communication is successful only to the extent that recip-
ients accept the views or arguments of the communicators.  Rather, they
define  risk communication  as successful when it  "raises the level of
understanding  of relevant  issues  or  actions  for  those  involved  and
satisfies them that they are adequately  informed within the limits  of
available knowledge  (National  Research  Council,  p.  2).
84Sandman  (1986) refers to the goal of the former  as "passive trust"
and of the latter as "rational alertness."  He stresses that the ultimate
goal of risk communication should be the development of a public that
is alert to the issues and rational in their approach to facing those issues.
Successful communication about risks surrounding food and water
issues poses challenging problems  and opportunities.  Covello and co-
workers  have characterized  four types  of problems  that arise in risk
communication:
1. Message  problems  - e.g.,  limitations  of scientific  risk  assess-
ments;
2.  Source problems  - e.g.,  limitations  of risk communicators  and
risk assessment experts in agreeing about the nature of the risk
and how to get that message  across  to the public;
3.  Channel problems  - e.g., limitations  in the means or media by
which scientific information about health or environmental risks
is transmitted;
4.  Receiver problems - e.g., characteristics of the intended recipients
of the communication.
Defining  Risk
Message  and  source  problems  are hampered  by the  fact that the
meaning  of "risk"  is fraught  with  confusion  and controversy.  Two
definitions of "risk"  seen in the literature highlight the chasm that ex-
ists between  how experts  and consumers  define risk.
Risk = Hazard/Safeguards.  Risk is commonly defined by experts as
"the probability of loss or injury."  In assessing  such risk,  hazard is
determined by asking:  "What could go wrong?"  "How  likely is it to
happen?" and "If it does, what will be the consequences?"  Once defined,
hazard  is then  divided  by  "safeguards"  to  arrive  at risk  (Rogers).
Safeguards are those practices that help keep a hazard from becoming
a reality. For example, if the potential hazard of getting salmonellosis
from eating raw chicken is one in three, cooking  is  a safeguard that
reduces  the risk to a much lower  figure.
Risk = Hazard +  Outrage. The public, however,  sees risk as much
more than the probability of a loss. Mortality statistics are one factor,
but not the only one, nor in some cases, the most important factor. Peter
Sandman (1987) describes these other factors as "outrage."  He defines
risk as the sum of hazard and outrage. When the public pays little at-
tention to hazard and the experts ignore outrage, then it should come
as no  surprise that the  two rate risks very differently.
Paul Slovic (1986) has developed the following list of characteristics


















Known  to science
Easily reduced
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In my back yard
Using the above lists, one can see why people can become much more
concerned  about the risks of cancer associated with passive smoking
(which  are controlled by others)  than with the direct risk associated
with smoking itself(which is controlled by self). Likewise one can under-
stand why the risk of cancer from natural toxicants such as aflatoxins
in peanuts  is viewed with far less fear than that from a certain  food
additive,  even though risk of cancer from the latter may be far less.
As noted by Sandman  (1987), "the risks that kill people often are not
the same  as the risks that frighten and anger people."
Communicating  with and through the Media
Mass  media  is a  powerful  force  in our  society.  It is  the  channel
through  which  much  information  about risk  is  conveyed.  Sandman
(1986) has identified several factors to consider when communicating
with the media about a health risk:
The reporter's  job is news, not education; events, not issues or prin-
ciples. The news is the risky thing that has happened, e.g., the discovery
that a food additive promotes cancer. It is not the difficult determina-
tion of your risk of getting cancer if you consume  the additive. If the
story is important enough,  these technical details may be covered in
a sidebar or a follow-up story on the third or fourth day.  Few stories,
however,  merit such attention.
Politics  are  more newsworthy than science. It is important to under-
stand that the politics of risk (e.g., what officials  or advocacy groups
say about a risk) sells far more newspapers than the hard science sur-
rounding the risk. This doesn't mean  scientists should not try to get
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assessments or the impossibility of zero risk. These need to be woven
into our  comments.  Sandman stresses,  however,  that reporters  and
editors may weed out these comments in an effort to simplify the story.
Reporters cover viewpoints, not "truths." Journalism,  like science,
attempts to be objective, but the two fields  define the term very  dif-
ferently.  For  science,  objectivity  is tentativeness  and  adherence  to
evidence  in  the  search  for  truth.  For  journalism,  objectivity  is
"balance."  From the journalistic point of view there is not truth, only
conflicting claims,  to be covered as fairly as possible, leaving the reader
or audience  to determine  the "truth."
According to Sandman,  on a scale of 0 to 10 representing all possible
views on an issue, reporters are wary of 0's, l's, 9's and 10's; these views
are seen as too extreme to be credible. They are covered as "oddball,"
if covered at all. Reporters also pay little attention to 4's, 5's, and 6's.
These positions are seen as too wishy-washy to make good copy. What
they like to report are 2's and 3's in alternating paragraphs or separate
stories with 7's and 8's. Objectivity to the journalist means giving both
sides  their chance,  and reporting  accurately what was  said.
If a risk story is  developing  and you have  a perspective  you want
to be covered,  don't wait to be called.  Instead,  call the reporter  and
tell your side.  When  at all possible,  Sandman recommended  you try
to be a 3 or a 7 - that is, a credible exponent of an identifiable view-
point.  Don't let yourself be pushed into  a position that is not yours,
but recognize  that journalism doesn't trust 0's and 10's and has little
use for 5's.
The media see environmental risk as a dichotomy; either the situa-
tion is hazardous or it is safe. Reporters  are accustomed  to the fact
that technical sources invariably hedge, that nothing is ever proven."
They see this as a kind of slipperiness and spend a fair amount of time
trying to get 5-ish  sources to make clear-cut  3 or 7 statements.  You
can provide  such statements  and  still avoid  dichotomizing the issue
as "risky"  or "safe"  by moving into a discussion  of "how risky"  the
situation is. Remember while you may resent the pressure to simplify,
you are far more qualified to do it than the reporter is to do it for you.
Decide in advance what your main points are,  and stress these con-
sistently and repetitively, even if you have to hook them onto answers
to irrelevant  questions. Also, stay away from jargon and explain any
technical terms  you must use.
Reporters try to personalize  risk. Scientists often are irritated with
the  media's  tendency  to personalize  a  story  by  such  questions  as
"Would you drink the water?" or "Would you choose surgery or drugs?"
Such questions fly in the face of the scientist's training to keep oneself
out of one's research and they confuse policy  questions with those of
personal choice.
Nevertheless,  reporters  consider  those questions  that  personalize
issues as the very best. They bring dead issues to life, make the abstract
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sources to dichotomize.  As was noted in an Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) study on the ethylene dibromide (EDB) controversy,  the
agency wanted to talk about "macro-risk"  (How many deaths will result
from EDB contamination?)  while reporters kept asking about "micro-
risk" (Is it okay to eat the cake mix?). For the individual citizen (faced
with a cake mix, not a regulatory proposal),  what to do with the cake
mix was  the issue,  not what to do with EDB.
Knowing that reporters will inevitably ask personalizing questions,
be prepared with answers. It is often possible to answer both one's per-
sonal views and one's policy recommendations,  and then to explain the
difference  if there is  one.
Claims of risk usually are more newsworthy than claims of safety.
On our scale of 0 to 10, the 3's and 7's share the bulk of the coverage,
but not equally.  Risk assertions receive  considerably  more media at-
tention than risk denials. This is not a bias, at least not as journalism
understands bias. It is built into the concept of newsworthiness.  If there
is no  allegation  of risk,  there is  no story.
Reporters do  their jobs  with  limited expertise and  time.  Most
reporters  are generalists with many stories to cover in a limited time.
When  working with reporters,  it's important to get back to them  in
a timely fashion with the information needed. Mass media is a power-
ful tool. It is up to us as scientists and educators to work cooperatively
with reporters  to get our  message  across  in a clear  and meaningful
manner.
Understanding and Communicating with the Public
Covello identifies receivers (individual citizens) as the fourth source
of problems in risk communication.  Researchers  who study risk com-
munication make the following observations regarding factors to con-
sider when  communicating  with the public on risks to health.
People's Perceptions of Risks May Not Agree with Reality. Slovic
and coworkers (1980) noted that people tend to overestimate the level
of risk  from events that are dramatic  and memorable  (e.g., botulism,
cancer). In contrast, they tend to underestimate risk from undramatic
causes, such as salmonellosis or diabetes. People also tend to consider
themselves  personally  immune to many  hazards  they  admit  pose  a
serious threat to others. For example, it has been shown that most peo-
ple rate  themselves  as  among the most skillful  and safe drivers  in a
population.
Moral Issues Have More Meaning than Risk Data. As discussed
above,  the public views risk as much more than mortality  statistics.
In many  cases morality,  not mortality,  is  seen  as the real issue.  For
example,  over the past several decades  our society has reached near-
consensus  that pollution  is  morally  wrong  - not just  harmful  or
dangerous, not just worth preventing where practical, but wrong (Sand-
man,  1986).
88As noted by Rayner and Cantor, the critical question facing societal
risk managers has become, not "How safe is safe enough?"  but, "How
fair is safe enough?"  Morality  issues  wreak  havoc with cost-benefit
analyses. How can one put a cash value on human life? Morality is not
an easy issue to deal with, but one that must be considered carefully,
both in evaluating  and communicating  about risks to health.
Strong  Beliefs are Hard to Modify. It is well known that people tend
to hear what they believe, not the other way around. According to Slovic
and associates  (1980), initial impressions,  once formed, tend to struc-
ture the way subsequent evidence is interpreted. New evidence appears
reliable and informative if it is consistent with one's initial belief;  con-
trary evidence is dismissed as unreliable, erroneous or unrepresentative.
Trust and Control Issues  Underlie Most Risk Controversies. Re-
searchers cite trust as a key problem in risk communication.  Few peo-
ple trust government and industry to protect them from environmen-
tal risk. While this is true of both passivists and activists,  the former
are considered more fatalistic and less likely to take things into their
own  hands (Sandman,  1986).
While trust may be the issue, Sandman does not feel "passive trust"
should be the goal. Translating the question of trust into the underlying
issue  of control,  the question  becomes  "Who  decides  what is  to  be
done?"  Sandman asserts that an environmental risk controversy  has
two levels: (1) the substantive issue of what to do; and (2) the process
issue of who decides. So long as people feel disempowered on the pro-
cess issue (who  decides),  they  are understandably  unbending  on the
substantive issue (what to do).
The situation can  be viewed as much like  that of a child  forced to
go to bed who protests the injustice of bedtime coercion without con-
sidering whether he or she is sleepy. It is hardly coincidental that risks
the public tend to overestimate (e.g. pesticides, food additives) generally
raise  serious  issues  of  trust  and  control,  while  most  of  the widely
underestimated risks (smoking, fat in the diet, insufficient exercise, driv-
ing without  a seatbelt)  are individual choices.
Sandman  (1986)  stresses  that  the gravest  problems  of risk  com-
munication arise when citizens  determine that the issue is important,
that the authorities  cannot be trusted,  and that they themselves  are
powerless.  Then comes  the backlash  of outrage.
Improving  Risk Communication
Are people educable about risks? Most risk communicators suggest
they  are.  In  fact, the NRC committee  on Risk Perception  and  Com-
munication  contends that, not only can lay citizens  understand risk,
but they can make important contributions to discussions and perspec-
tives regarding risk-benefit issues. Below are several suggestions made
by researchers  on how to improve  communication  about risk.
Avoid Finger  Pointing  Comments. Pam Jones of Jones Communica-
tions, an environmental issues/public relations firm, warns against the
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wants good looking food at cheap costs." No one likes to have the finger
pointed at himself  as the root of a complex problem, especially when
he or she has no say in the decision. Besides, who knows, maybe people
would be willing to pay more for increased  safety if given the choice.
Acknowledge  Uncertainties and Limits to Expertise; Accept Emo-
tions as Legitimate. According to Jones,  communicators  of risk gain
support when they acknowledge limitations in knowledge of the effects
of x, y and z chemicals,  for example, openly discuss trade-offs and alter-
natives,  then explain the reasons  for using the chemical  and what is
being done to protect the consumer.  Such an approach admits the uncer-
tain nature of chemical use and forces people to deal with that uncer-
tainty  rather than deny  it exists.  In a similar  vein, Sandman  (1986)
stresses the importance of acknowledging the feelings of people before
trying to explain anything substantive about the risk at hand. While
this  will not eliminate  the anger,  it  will help  reduce the outrage  and
the need to insist on the anger,  thereby freeing energy to focus on the
issues instead.
Consider Presentation  Format  Carefully. Since the public responds
more to outrage than to hazard, Sandman (1987) recommends that risk
managers  and communicators  work  to  make  serious  hazards  more
outrageous.  One way is through presentation format. As an example,
motorists in one study expressed greater interest in wearing seatbelts
when  informed that their risk of a disabling injury over  a fifty-year
lifetime of driving was 1 in 3 than when told that one in every 100,000
person  trips resulted in  a disabling injury.  Another way to increase
outrage is to hit hard on the morality of an issue.  Recent campaigns
against drunk  driving  and  sidestream  cigarette  smoke provide  two
models  of successful  efforts to increase  public concern about serious
hazards  by feeding  the outrage.
Cross-Hazard Comparisons May  Be  Misleading. One  approach
sometimes used to "deepen people's perspective"  regarding risk is to
present quantified risk estimates for a variety of hazards. We have all
seen tables such as those developed by Wilson equating the risk of death
from smoking  1.4 cigarettes  to eating  100 charcoal broiled  steaks to
living two months in Denver on vacation from New York (all risks which
increase  the chance  of death in any year by one  in a million).  As in-
teresting as these comparisons may be, they have a number of inherent
limitations. For example, although it may be enlightening to know that
a single takeoff or landing in a commercial  airliner  reduces one's  life
expectancy by 15 minutes, upon landing one will either die prematurely
(almost certainly by more than  15 minutes)  or one will not. What  are
missing in these estimates are the outrage factors...  the voluntariness,
controllability and familiarity of the risk, the immediacy of the conse-
quences, and the degree to which benefits are distributed equitably to
those  who  bear  the  risk.  Because  of  such  omissions,  Slovic  and
coworkers  (1980)  have  characterized  arithmetic  cross-hazard  com-
parisons  as "the kindergarten  of risk."
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learn more and assess what they learn more carefully if they exercise
some real control over the ultimate decision. While this power-sharing
is enormously  difficult,  it  can be  well worth the effort.
The goal of power-sharing is to enlist the rationality of the citizenry,
so that citizens and experts are working together to figure out how great
the risk is and what to do about it. Of course, no responsible agency
should go public without any answers. What's important is to propose
options x, y and  z tentatively, with  genuine openess to v and w and
to comments  that may eliminate z. A list of options and alternatives
- and a fair and open procedure for comparing them and adding new
ones  - is far  more  conducive  to real power-sharing  than a "draft"
decision.
Public participation on risk decisions  is not only the moral right of
citizens,  but  is sound  policy.  When  consumers participate  in a  risk
management  decision they are far more likely to accept it, for at least
three reasons:  (1) They have instituted changes that make it objectively
more acceptable; (2) They have gotten past the process issue of control
and mastered the technical data on why the experts consider the risk
acceptable; and (3) They have been heard and not excluded, and so can
appreciate the legitimacy of the decision even if they continue to dislike
the decision  itself.
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